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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
be by state administrative board or the courts, "without
compelling directions to that effect" 2 from Congress, even
though Congress has vested in the national board and the
federal courts power to exercise the same remedy.
RICA2m R. SIGCON
Joint Adventure Agreement Survives Incorporation
DeBoy v. Harris4
In 1948 A, B and C orally agreed to associate themselves
as joint adventurers in a business of furnishing warehouse
facilities. They formed a corporation as an instrumentality
to carry out the joint enterprise. It was agreed that each
venturer was to have a fixed proportionate interest in the
assets and to receive a fixed percentage of the profits.
Shares in the corporation were issued according to the
agreed interests of the parties: A, 28%, B, 52%, and C, 20%.
By 1952 the venture had become quite successful, and
it would appear that the net worth of the enterprise far
exceeded the par value of the shares held by the joint
adventurers. B and C removed A as an officer and director
in the corporation. By resolution of the board of directors,
they recommended an increase in the authorized capital
stock of the corporation, and as stockholders, approved the
necessary charter amendment. New shares were later
issued to B and his nominees. A's pre-emptive right to pur-
chase a proportionate share of the new issue, however, was
not denied. A alleged that B's and C's purpose in causing
this additional issue of stock was to destroy his interest in
the enterprise since they knew that by offering such a large
number of shares A would be financially unable to pur-
chase enough of the shares to maintain his agreed propor-
tionate interest.
A brought suit at law for the breach of the joint adven-
ture agreement to recover the damages he sustained by
the watering down of the interest allotted to him in the
agreement. The lower court sustained a demurrer, and
2876 S. Ct. 794, 799 - The argument (ibid, p. 796) "that a State Board
will use this power to stop force and violence in order to further state labor
policy, thus creating a conflict with the federal policy as developed by the
National Labor Relations Board" did not impress the majority as being
sufficient to oust historic state police power, absent more explicit directions
from Congress.
1207 Md. 212, 113 A. 2d 903 (1955).
[VOL. XVI
DeBOY v. HARRIS
judgment was entered for B and C. Held, judgment re-
versed, with costs, and the case remanded to equity for
an accounting.2
The Court of Appeals held that where a corporation is
the mere instrumentality for carrying out a joint adven-
ture, incorporation does not terminate the agreement of
the co-adventurers. Therefore, B and C could not use the
corporate entity as a shield against personal liability for
the breach of their antecedent agreement.
There is a conflict of authority on whether or not part-
ners or joint adventurers may use the corporate entity as
a tool of their enterprise. Several cases, including the in-
stant one, follow Wabash Ry. Co. v. American Refrigerator
Transit Co.' in giving effect to the real intent of the parties.
On the other hand, the New York courts and others follow
Jackson v. Hooper4 in holding that public policy does not
permit a partnership to masquerade as a corporation be-
cause the partners should not get the advantages of both
limited liability and partnership control.
In Manacher v. Central Coal Co.' the New York Appel-
late Division expressed the Jackson v. Hooper rule as
follows:
"Individuals may enter into partnership agreements
or joint ventures independent of the corporate form
but they may not organize a corporation for the pur-
pose of carrying on a joint venture. Thereby they
would become joint venturers inter sese and a corpora-
tion to the rest of the world with the privilege of chang-
ing from coadventurer to stockholder as the situation
might require."
The rationale underlying the Jackson v. Hooper view
would appear particularly inappropriate in the situation
presented by the DeBoy case. The policy against infringing
on the discretion of corporate directors is an important
2 A joint adventure may be defined as a "partnership for a single trans-
action or for a limited number of transactions", Hobdey v. Wilkinson, 201
Md. 517, 526, 94 A. 2d 625 (1953). Were the parties actually "Joint adven-
turers" as distinguished from "partners"? See Mullen, Joint Adventure8,
8 Md. L. Rev. 22 (1943).
'7 F. 2d 335 (8th Cir., 1925), cert. den. 270 U. S. 643 (1926). This is the
majority view according to BALLANTINE, COEPOa.ATIONS (Rev. ed., 1946),
Sec. 183(6).
'76 N. J. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (1910).
5 284 App. Div. 380, 131 N. Y. S. 2d 671 (1954), aff'd. 308 N. Y. 784, 125
N. E. 2d 431 (1955), noted 55 Col. L. Rev. 419 (1955).
8Ibid, 131 N. Y. S. 2d 671, 677. Cf. LaVarre v. Hall, 42 F. 2d 65 (5th
Cir., 1930), where it was held that a partnership may acquire shares and
thereby control corporations.
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element in the Jackson v. Hooper line of cases. Here, how-
ever, the joint venture agreement merely sought to pre-
serve a fixed proportional interest in the enterprise and did
not purport to affect the directors' control over business
decisions. Moreover, here, all the present shareholders had
agreed to the arrangement - a fact which ordinarily fore-
closes an attack on this ground.
In Shore v. Union Drug Co.7 the pre-incorporation agree-
ment of the parties provided for the formation of a corpor-
ation with ownership in fixed proportions. One of the par-
ties took control of the corporation initially, and acting
under resolution of the board of directors cut out the others
by refusing to issue them stock. The Delaware Court held
that specific performance of the pre-incorporation agree-
ment could be had. Just as in the present case, the defen-
dant contended that the plaintiffs must be relegated to their
stockholder's remedies, if any. Various other "freeze out"
cases are in accord with the view that the corporation is
incidental to the contract between the parties, and that the
individual contract rights survive incorporation.8
It should be pointed out that the decisions, both in the
instant case and in the Union Drug Co. case appear to be
predicated on the basis that the rights of third parties are
not adversely affected.9 Thus as a practical matter the scope
of the instant case may be limited to close corporations.
In other situations the rights of third parties are likely
to be adversely affected. 10 It is also well to note that the
Maryland Corporation Law will allow charter provisions
to require unanimous board or shareholder action." Hence,
718 Del. Ch. 74, 156 A. 204 (1931).8 Rogers v. Penobscot Mining Co., 154 F. 606 (8th Cir., 1907) ; Wallace
v. Eclipse Pocahontas Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 321, 98 S. E. 293 (1919) ; Bailey
v. Interstate Airmotive, 358 Mo. 1121, 219 S. W. 2d 333, 8 A. L. R. 2d 710
(1949).
9This limitation seems well established, at least by dictum; Bailey v.
Interstate Airmotive, ibid. Elsbach v. Mulligan, 58 Cal. App. 2d 354, 136 P.
2d 651 (1943), apparently relies upon the fact that third parties have not
been adversely affected. The dicta of Wabash Railroad Co. v. American
Refrigerator Transit Co., supra, n. 3, is quoted by the Maryland Court of
Appeals to this effect in the instant case, supra, n. 1, 219.
10 In an analogous problem to that of the incorporated partnership, agree-
ments which provide that one party is to have permanent employment with
the corporation restricts the future action of the board of directors, and
have been held invalid for that reason, West v. Camden, 135 U. S. 507
(1890); In re Petrol Terminal Corp., 120 F. Supp. 867 (D. Md., 1954).
However, where all the shareholders agree, such an agreement has been held
valid, Clark v. Dodge, 269 N. Y. 410, 199 N. E. 641 (1936).
See BALLANTINE, Op. cit., supra, n. 3, Sec. 183(4) and (5), and IsRAELs,
The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 Cornell L. Q. 488 (1948).
11 Md. Code (1951), Art. 23, Sec. 38(b) and 52(d), authorize a quorum of
greater than a majority. In Roland Pk. Shop. Center v. Hendler, 206 Md.
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it appears that the present plaintiff could have protected
his proportionate ownership and control by appropriate
charter provision.
In the DeBoy case the hardship of the plaintiff is in the
foreground. The pre-emptive right to purchase shares 2 is
of relatively little solace to one whose financial circum-
stances will not permit buying new shares. If the financially
embarrassed adventurer is held to a shareholder's deriva-
tive action, he must overcome a strong presumption that the
board of directors acted in the best interests of the corpora-
tion, and a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of majority
shareholders is hard to find where pre-emptive stock rights
have been accorded the minority.
It therefore appears that the Jackson v. Hooper view,
holding the Proteus-like "incorporated partnership" void
per se, is a rather severe penalty for failure to insert the
appropriate clause in the charter, such as a provision that
all shareholders must agree to any additional issue of stock.
In the light of the widespread use of the close corporation,
and the various ownership and control arrangements sanc-
tioned by modern corporation law, there appears to be no
logical reason for such a harsh result, which would seem
to be turning on form rather than substance. The approach
of the Maryland courts would seem preferable.
PAuL T. MCHENRY, JR.
10, 109 A. 2d 753 (1954), the court said that a requirement for unanimous
board or shareholder action is valid both under pre-existing law and under
the current statute.
12 See Md. Oode (1951), Art. 23, Sec. 26, on pre-emptive rights.
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